Coming of Age

In "Coming of Age in a Weapons Lab," social anthropologist Hugh Gusterson analyzes the Livermore Laboratory (founded in 1952), one of only two nuclear testing sites in the United States, and the people that work there; he constructs a social analysis of the employees and how they rationalize the work they perform, especially in light of a disbanding Soviet Union, whose previous nuclear threats were almost the only justification for this particular arms race.  The other laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, was the first, originally the only nuclear weapons manufacturer in the U.S.  In the study, Gusterson comes to rid himself of the previous ideologies he had of nuclear scientists: politically conservatism, second-rate nature, and conflicted conscience, to name a few.  In the interviews he conducts and the people he meets, his views slowly change with the findings that surprised him: he finds many scientists here turned down other jobs in lieu of the one at Livermore, they were not in fact sell-outs or second-rate scientists; around half of the scientists were liberals, many opposing the Korean and Vietnam Wars; and many rationalized quite well their role in producing the type of weapon that, when in enough supply, could literally destroy an entire planet. 
In conducting this study, he draws upon two philosophical ideologies surrounding the rationalization of nuclear testing.  He brings up the deontological belief, that of wrongful intentions.  The idea, here, is that solely creating the nuclear missiles is bad enough; why build something you never intend to use? In other words, believers of this line of thought believe the means most be individually justified.  In contrast, Gusterson gains awareness that many if not all of the scientists he interviewed were of the almost-opposite belief: consequentialism.  Under this mindset, the sole fact that possessing nuclear bombs deters enemies that possess them from attacking is justification enough for their creation.  In fact, a testament to this is that the large majority of the scientists in the facility did not believe that any of the warheads they created would be launched.  This strikes me, personally, as a very strict dichotomy of thinking that, at least from my limited anthropological perspective, does not make sense.  While I understand the justification and how nuclear warhead creators can carry out their job without fear that they are destroying the world.  However, warhead creation used only as a preventative measure MUST draw the questions of preventing what?  Should everyone's enemies create nuclear missiles so no one can detonate them?  The only way I stand to rationalize it is with Gusterson's mention of the scientific argot that aids to a sort of dissonance, a cover from the end result.  The way I envision it, in the day-to-day, these very intelligent people can go about their work as if putting pieces of a complicated puzzle together; only after this puzzle is put together can it hold any sort of destructive (or preventative) power.  And in combination with the consequentialism train of thought, these men and women can exist happily in their secluded and often chastised world.